When the exchange rate is priced by uncovered interest parity and central banks set nominal interest rates according to a reaction function such as the Taylor rule, the real exchange rate will be determined by expected inflation differentials and output gap or unemployment gap differentials. In this paper I examine the implications of these Taylor-rule fundamentals for real exchange rate determination in an environment in which market participants are ignorant of the numerical values of the model's coefficients but use least-squares learning rules to acquire that information. I report evidence that this simple learning environment provides a plausible framework for understanding real deutschemark-dollar exchange rate from 1973 to 2005. The least-squares learning path for the real exchange rate is able to capture six major swings observed in the data.
Introduction
Understanding the macroeconomic determinants of the exchange rate has posed a challenge to research ever since Meese and Rogoff (1983) reported a seemingly nonexistent relationship between macro fundamentals and the exchange rate. While there has been progress in econometrically modeling long-horizon exchange-rate returns, the basic predictions of open economy macroeconomic theory-that the exchange rate is determined by the levels of variables such as domestic and foreign prices, money supplies, and income-receives only tepid empirical support. 1 In this paper, I investigate the linkage between the exchange rate and an alternative set of fundamentals that are implied when monetary policy is guided by a nominal interest rate reaction function commonly referred to as the 'Taylor (1993) rule.' The Taylor-rule approach predicts that the exchange rate is determined by relative expected inflation gaps and relative output or unemployment gaps which is in sharp contrast to the standard fundamentals typically used in empirical work on exchange rates. A successful implementation of the Taylor-rule approach would suggest that at least some of the frustration encountered in earlier work may stem from a focus on the wrong set of fundamentals.
In the environment that I study, market participants do not know the exact values of the Taylor-rule coefficients and employ least-squares learning rules to acquire that information. 2 The learning model provides a useful and plausible framework for understanding observed real exchange rate dynamics over the post Bretton Woods float for the deutschemark(DM)-dollar rate. I find that the implied least-squares learning path is generally able to account for the volatility found in the data as well as six major swings: The real dollar depreciation of the 1970s, the great appreciation (1979. 4-1984.4) , the great depreciation (1985. 1-1987.4 ), a tempered dollar depreciation (1988.1-1995.1), a dollar appreciation (1995. 2-2001.2) , and a depreciation (2001.3-2005.4) that continues through the time of this writing. 3 The paper focuses on the DM-dollar exchange rate primarily because the Bundesbank is one of the non-US central banks identified by Clarida et al. (1998) as having conducted monetary policy by following a variant of the Taylor rule. The 1 See Mark (1995), Mark and Sul (2001) , Groen (2000 Groen ( ,2002 , and Rapach and Wohar (2002) who report econometric evidence on the long-horizon predictability of exchange rate returns from standard macro pricing errors. The relation between exchange rates and levels of macro fundamentals is predicted by theory ranging from disequilibrium Keynesian models of Dornbusch (1976) , Mussa (1982) and Obstfeld (1985) to the new open-economy macroeconomics of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) . 2 Lewis (1989a, b) conducts an analysis of Bayesian learning in the foreign exchange market to examine the 1979 changes in the Fed's operating procedures. She focused on shifts in the stochastic process governing monetary aggregates. In the monetary policy literature, Bullard and Mitra (2002) study conditions under which the rational expectations equilibrium is learnable while Orphanides (2003) examines whether the Fed's imperfect knowledge of and attempts to learn the natural rate of unemployment responsible for the inflationary buildup of the 1970s. 3 The 'great appreciation' and 'great depreciation' terminology is from Papell (2002) . Engel and Hamilton (1990) called these fluctuations 'long-swings, ' and Frankel (1985) referred to the strong dollar of the 80s as the 'dazzling dollar. ' role of interest rate differentials in the study of real exchange rate determination is not new and many strategies for modeling interest rate dynamics have been tried in the past. One innovation associated with the Taylor-rule approach however, is that it sets up a multivariate structure with a rich set of dynamics for interest rate forecasts that are potentially more accurate than those obtained from univariate time-series specifications. 4 My motivation for incorporating learning comes from two sources. From a general perspective, one notes that the generally poor track record of macroeconomic rational expectations models suggests that relaxing some of the strong informational assumptions typically required-that market participants already know the very structure that econometricians themselves struggle to learn-may be a useful avenue to explore. Both direct evidence of structural instability and indirect evidence through the modest to poor out-of-sample fit of econometric exchange rate models are hints that parameter uncertainty is an important feature of the environment that should be explicitly accounted for. Adaptive learning schemes provide a plausible and tractable strategy for modeling market participants that must deal with a changing environment.
The other motivation specifically concerns changes in the way that central banks respond to expected inflation-such as the change that occurred with the appointment of Paul Volker to the Federal Reserve chairmanship in 1979-represent significant innovations in the economic environment that may be important to model. Clarida et. al. (2000) reports evidence in this vein having found that in the pre-1979 data, an increase in expected inflation led to a reduction in the real interest rate because the Fed typically reacted by raising the nominal interest rate by less than the increase in expected inflation. Following the appointment of Paul Volker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve System, they found the real interest rate to be increasing in expected inflation because the Fed reacted more aggressively by raising the nominal interest rate by more than the increase in expected inflation. I also estimate central bank reaction functions but in differential (Bundesbank-Fed) form. My estimates also exhibit the type of instability found in the Fed's reaction function by Clarida et al. Presumably, it sometimes take time for the public to first to perceive that a shift has occurred and then to understand the nature of the shift. If so, then modeling the transitional learning that goes on should be appropriate and beneficial.
Apart from the learning aspect, this paper joins a growing literature that has studied the role of interest rate reaction functions in exchange rate determination. Engel and West (2006) construct the rational expectations time path of the real exchange rate implied by reaction function fundamentals and report a correlation of 0.32 between the implied rational expectations real DM-dollar rate and the historically observed real exchange rate from 1979 to 1998. Moldostva and Papell (2007) find that Taylor-rule fundamentals have significant out-of-sample predictive power for future exchange rates. Engel et al. (2007) examine predictive ability of Taylor-rule fundamentals in a panel regression framework and Clarida and Waldman (2007) show that the exchange rate response to higher than expected inflation is consistent with the operation of the Taylor rule. In related work, Groen and Matsumoto (2004) calibrate a dynamic general equilibrium to the UK economy where monetary policy operates through interest rate reaction functions.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the data. Section 2 presents estimates of the Taylor rule in differential form. The purpose of reporting these results is twofold. First, the evidence provides the basic support for modeling the German-U.S. interest differential with this specification and second, it provides evidence that the Taylor-rule coefficients change over time. Section 3 presents a rational expectations model of the real exchange rate based on real interest parity and the learning algorithm that agents employ to understand the model. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. Section 5 presents additional results with some discussion and Section 6 concludes.
The Data
The data set consists of quarterly observations that span from 1960.1 to 2005.4. The U.S. Federal funds rate, GDP and potential GDP were obtained from FRED, the St. Louis Fed's economic data web site. All other data were obtained from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics database. An imputed DM-dollar exchange rate is used from 1998.1 through the end of the sample. Goods prices are measured by the real GDP deflator (IFS series code 13499BIRZF). A break in the German price level occurring at the time of reunification (1990.4-1991.1) was smoothed as in Engel and West (2006) by assuming that West German inflation between 1990.4 and 1991.1 applied to all of Germany, and using that factor to scale the post 1990 price data.
I consider three definitions of the economic activity gap. The first, is the output gap, defined as the proportional deviation of actual from potential GDP constructed by source statistical agency (henceforth source output gap). For Germany, the availability of potential GDP from source begins in 1966.1. To create a series that begins in 1960.1, these data are spliced together with real GDP detrended by the Hodrick-Prescott (1997) (HP) filter. The second measure of the activity gap is a recursively HP detrended real GDP series (henceforth HP output gap). While many authors employ the output gap for x, other authors, such as Orphanides and Williams (2003) employ the unemployment gap. Thus, the third measure I use is a recursively HP detrended unemployment rate (henceforth HP unemployment gap). Quarterly inflation, the output gap, the nominal exchange-rate return and interest rates are stated as raw numbers. Germany is viewed as the 'home' country and an increase in the real exchange rate signifies a real DM depreciation. Two preliminary conclusions can be drawn from this informal examination of the data. First, the figures suggest that shifting the emphasis on exchange rate determinants away from relative levels of macroeconomic fundamentals towards variables such as the differences in differences of log national price levels may be a sensible thing to do. Second, one gets the impression from the figures that the relationship between the real exchange rate and the inflation differential changed sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980s. An obvious candidate for such a regime shift, is the change in the conduct of monetary policy. We now turn to an examination of the regime shift in the context of real exchange rate determination.
Differentials in interest rate reaction functions
This section presents evidence to support modeling the interest differential as a differential in monetary policy reaction functions under cross-country homogeneity restrictions on coefficients of expected inflation and the economic activity gap.
Let German variables be subscripted by 'G' and U.S. variables subscripted by 'U.' German-U.S. differentials have no special notation. Then π t = (π G,t − π U,t ), i t = (i G,t − i U,t ), and x t = (x G,t − x U,t ) are German-U.S. differentials in inflation, short-term nominal interest rates and activity gaps, respectively. The activity gap is defined such that the economy operates in excess of its potential when x tj > 0, j = G, U. The log real exchange rate is q t .
My specification of the interest rate reaction function and the proposed breakpoint draws on Clarida et al. (2000) . They estimated the Fed's inflation response coefficient to be less than 1 in the pre-Volker years and to be greater than 1 in the post-Volker era. The weak nominal interest rate response found before 1979 meant that increases in expected inflation caused the real interest rate to decline whereas the aggressive response found after 1979 means that an increase in expected inflation would cause the real interest rate to rise. In the international dimension, Clarida et al. (1998) estimate monetary policy reaction functions for the Bundesbank and several other countries using data spanning from 1979 to 1993. They find that over this period, Bundesbank reactions to changes in inflation were similar to those of the post-1979 Fed. 5 In the present analysis, I first assume that the Fed sets the deviation of the Fed funds target rate from the desired rate ³ i T U,t − i U´, in response to the deviation of the public's expected inflation rate from the target rate (E t π U,t+1 − π U ) , and the activity gap x U,t , according to
Note that the central bank and the public both employ the same model to forecast future inflation. The actual interest rate is subject to an exogenous and i.i.d. policy shock η U,t , and is set according to a partial adjustment mechanism to reflect the central bank's desire to limit interest rate volatility,
The Bundesbank is assumed to act in an analogous fashion but it may also react to nominal exchange rate deviations from its 'natural level,' which is given by purchasing-power parity. Clarida et al. (1998) found that the feedback from the exchange rate to the German interest rate was statistically significant but quantitatively very small. The German interest rate target is set by the rule, i
where homogeneity of the coefficients (γ π , γ x ) has been imposed across countries. We thus have the empirical specification of the interest differential,
To estimate the differential in interest rate reaction functions, add and subtract (1 − ρ)γ π e π t+1 on the right side of (3) and rearrange to obtain
where
Under rational expectations, the composite error term η 0 t is uncorrelated with date t information so (5) can be estimated by generalized method of moments (GMM ). The instrumental variables that I employ are a constant, the current value and three lags of the inflation differential, the current value and three lags of the output (alternatively unemployment) gap differential, four lags of the nominal interest differential, and four lags of the real exchange rate.
When x is the output (unemployment) gap, we expect its coefficient γ x to be positive (negative) so that an economy operating below potential will trigger a loosening of credit. I estimate (5) over pre-and post-1979 sub-samples with the split occurring at 1979.3 to conform to Clarida et al. (2000) . The results, reported in Table 1 , are similar across the alternative measures of the activity gap before 1979. Point estimates of the inflation response coefficient lie below 1 and are not statistically significant before 1979. Point estimates of the inflation response all lie above 1 after 1979 and are significant. The estimated coefficient on the activity gap has the correct sign and is generally statistically significant. The estimated exchange rate response enters with the predicted sign but is small and significant only before 1979. Hansen's GMM test (J-statistic) of the over identifying restrictions does not reject the specification.
The structural shift in the Fed's interest rate reaction function reported by Clarida et al. appears present also in the differential form. To formally examine the evidence for a structural shift, I run Hodrick and Srivastava's (1984) GMM-test for structural change. 6 The hypothesis of no structural change in any of the coefficients is strongly rejected when either the source output gap or the HP output gap enters the Taylor rule. The weakest evidence that a structural shift occurred comes with using the HP unemployment gap (p-value = 0.063).
A visual account of the fit is provided in Figure 3 which plots the actual interest differential and fitted values using the source output gap. In generating these fitted values, I employ forecasts of the inflation differential generated by a fourth order bivariate autoregression in the inflation differential and the source output gap differential. It can be seen that this simple specification works reasonably well in describing the dynamics of the interest differential. Tractability in the ensuing analysis is facilitated by imposing coefficient homogeneity in the interest rate rule across countries, and the estimation results suggest that imposing these restrictions is not unreasonable.
Assuming that the German authorities react to the contemporaneous real exchange rate is similar to the specification employed by the Engel and West (2006) study. It also involves an issue of simultaneity that is easily dealt with in the rational expectations context but is somewhat troublesome in the learning environment. The rule assumes that in setting i t , the central banks already observe q t . But before q t can be determined, market participants will need to see i t . This simultaneity which is typically not addressed in the rational expectations equilibrium creates an awkward situation in the learning environment. One way to eliminate this simultaneity problem is by letting the real exchange rate enter the policy rule with a one-period lag. Thus, I consider an 6 The k−dimensional coefficient vector estimated from subsample j = 1, 2 be β j is has asymptotic distribu-
. If the observations from the two subsamples are independent, then under null hypothesis of no structural change H0 :
is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square variate with k degrees of freedom.
alternative formulation that avoids this simultaneity by working with a Taylor rule of the form, Table 3 reports results from estimating (6) by GMM. It is seen that the empirical performance of this specification is nearly identical to that of (4). There is little change in the point estimates and somewhat less evidence against the specification from Hansen's test of the overidentifying restrictions.
Modeling real exchange rate dynamics with learning
This section describes the minimum state variable (MSV) rational expectations equilibrium and the learning methodology that the public employs to discover the equilibrium. The public understands the exact structure of the economic environment but does not know the numerical values of relevant coefficients and/or parameters and employs least-squares learning rules to form beliefs about those values. I adopt a relatively unstructured approach in the sense that the differentials in inflation and the activity gap are generated by a bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) and the interest rate differential is generated by the Taylor rule. Market participants view the policy rule in conjunction with the VAR as the data generating process which they use to construct forecasts of future differentials in inflation, activity, and interest rates.
Learning the Rational Expectations Equilibrium
The economic model of the exchange rate is uncovered interest parity. For the log nominal exchange rate s t , we have
To price the real exchange rate, add and subtract E t π t+1 from the right side of (7) and rearrange to get (8) is the model of the real exchange rate. We next make some assumptions about how expected inflation and the expected exchange rate are determined in order to obtain a solution to (8) . First, I let π and x be governed by a VAR(4). 7 Let Y 0 t = (π t , . . . , π t−3 , x t , . . . , x t−3 ) , and
. Then the regression form of the VAR is 7 In the empirical work that follows, the BIC rule identifies a 4-th order VAR as appropriate.
where B 1 and B 2 are 9 x 1 least-squares coefficient vectors. The VAR has the companion representation
that is convenient for generating forecasts (see the appendix). The activity gap differential can be recovered from the companion form of the VAR by defining the 1 x 8 row vector e 2 that has 1 as the (1, 5) −th element and zeros elsewhere such that x t = e 2 Y t . Similarly, let e 1 be a 1 x 8 row vector with 1 as the (1, 1) −th element and zeros elsewhere such that π t = e 1 Y t . Then the one-step ahead forecast of the inflation differential is
Substituting (12) and (6) into (8) gives the second-order stochastic difference equation in q t ,
The MSV rational expectations solution to (13) is,
where the coefficients are given recursively as
The solution is obviously not unique. In evaluating the rational expectations path, I choose the solution that gives positive values of a 2 since the exchange rate is a persistent process and rational agents should know that the lagged exchange rate will enter with a positive coefficient. Notice that the coefficient vector b depends on the inflation response coefficient γ π . The shift in the estimated response coefficient might provide an explanation for the divergence between the trends in the real exchange rate and the German-U.S. inflation differential in the post-Volker sample. Because γ π < 1 in the pre-Volker sample, a decline in the expected German-US inflation differential might have led the public to expect an increase in the German-US real interest differential and a real depreciation of the dollar whereas with γ π > 1 in the post-1979 sample, a decline in the expected inflation differential may have led the public to expect a decline in the German-US interest differential and a real appreciation of the dollar.
Learning the rational expectations equilibrium. Unless strong assumptions are made about the knowledge held by market participants regarding the underlying economic environment, the analysis of the rational expectations real exchange rate path begs the question as to whether the observed real exchange rate data over the float was plausibly generated by the model. I now relax some of these informational assumptions by setting market participants in a learning environment. Agents know the relevant functional forms so there is no model uncertainty or misspecification. However, they do not know the policy rule parameter values or the true coefficient values of the VAR that governs actual inflation differentials and the output gap. In 'real time,' the public proceeds as a would-be econometrician who acquires knowledge of the relevant coefficients using least-squares learning rules [Evans and Honkapojian (2001) ].
The learning path is obtained by solving (8) using expectations formed from people's perceived law of motion. At time t, given coefficient vectors B 1,t−1 , B 2,t−1 estimated in t − 1, agents use the regression form of the VAR
and associated companion form
to construct expected inflation E t π t+1 = e 1 (α t−1 + A t−1 Y t ) . Since agents believe the rational expectation solution is (27) , the perceived law of motion for the exchange rate is
observations on the policy shock η t from the perceived law of motion for the interest differential
where B 4,t−1 = ¡ δ t−1 , ρ t−1 , θ π,t−1 , θ x,t−1 , θ q,t−1 ¢ and Z 4,t = (1, i t−1 , e 1 (α t−1 + A t−1 Y t ) , e 2 Y t , q t−1 ) . The expected exchange rate is therefore,
Plugging the inflation forecast and (24) into (8) gives the actual law of motion,
To get set for next period, agents engage in least-squares updating of the coefficients as follows. Let y 1,t = π t , y 2,t = x t, y 3,t = q t , and y 4,t = i t . For given R j,t−1 (j = 1, ..., 4) , and a fixed gain g, the updating formulae are
The learning path and coefficient updating is generated using observations of π t , x t , and i t from the data, but not with exchange rate data. The learning values of q t generated by the actual law of motion and employed in coefficient updating are generated solely as functions of π, x, and i.
Implied Rational and Learning Exchange Rate Paths
The real exchange rate behaves differently under a flexible exchange rate regime than it does under a fixed regime [e.g., Mussa (1986), Baxter and Stockman (1989) ]. Also, because exchange controls were in place during the 1960's and early 1970s, uncovered interest parity would not be expected to work well prior to the float. Although the data extend back to 1960, I generate the implied rational expectations real exchange rate beginning in 1973.1 with the primary of understanding the real exchange rate over the float.
For each measure of the activity gap, the implied rational expectations paths are built by taking estimated values of the coefficients in the Taylor rule and the VAR from pre-and postVolker samples ¡ ρ, γ π , γ x , γ q , α, A ¢ , and plugging them into the a j and b coefficients given in (15 )- (19) . Market participants are assumed to have known about the regime change in monetary policy, the Taylor-rule coefficient values and the VAR coefficient values under each regime. I then fed in values of i t , π t ,and x t from the data according to (14) to generate the implied rational path. However, the rational path obtained by directly plugging in the estimates of the Taylor-rule  coefficients from Table 2 were unrealistically volatile. The reason is the very small value of γ q produces roots of the autoregressive polynomial near 1. To obtain implied rational expectations paths with reasonable volatility, the results I report were obtained by setting γ q = 0.2 with all other coefficients and parameter values are set equal to their estimated values. To examine the extent to which the rational and learning paths explain the data, I report correlations between the implied paths and the data and the volatility of the implied exchange rates relative to the data. The calculations are carried out for observations in log levels and for 1,4,8, and 16 quarter returns. These results, reported in Table 3 , show that the comovements between the rational expectations exchange rate and the data are best captured when the HP unemployment gap is used in the Taylor rule (correlation = 0.484) with the next best correlation captured using the source gap (correlation = 0.308). For quarterly returns, the correlations are much lower for the source and HP unemployment gaps but are quite large for the longer return horizons. The high correlation in levels and 16-quarter returns is evidence that the rational path is matching both the levels and trends of the data. Recall, however, that this is being done with a relatively large value of γ q that is not supported by the the Taylor-rule estimates. While the path generated with the source gap matches the volatility in the data, the HP output gap is still too volatile and the path generated with the HP unemployment gap is too smooth.
Turning now to the implied learning paths, the public believes that they operate in an environment that may be subject to continual change but they may not know at the time if or when a particular regime change has occurred. In this scenario, it makes sense to employ recursive least squares learning rule with a constant gain specification as in Orphanides and Williams (2003) . I follow these authors by setting g = 0.02 which they calibrated to expectational adjustments of professional forecasters. Observations from 1960.2 to 1972.4 are used to estimate initial values for the covariance matrices R jt and least-squares coefficients B jt .
The levels correlations for the learning paths dominate the performance of the rational paths when using either the source or HP output gaps. The 0.34 correlation using the HP unemployment gap and the 0.35 correlation with the source gap are reasonably large. As with the rational paths, we obtain low correlations for 1-quarter returns and high correlations for 16-quarter returns. Learning paths generated with the source output and the HP unemployment gaps match the volatility in the data while the path generated with the HP detrended output is too smooth.
The implied rational and learning paths for the exchange rate using source output gap are plotted in Figures 4 and 5. Figures 6 and 7 show analogous paths generated with the HP output gap and Figures 8 and 9 use the HP unemployment gap. The observations are standardized to highlight comovements between the series.
Using the source output gap, the rational path shown in Figure 4 misses a good deal of the real dollar appreciation from 1980.4 to 1984.4 and falsely predicts a dollar appreciation from 1989.3 to 1991.2. It also erroneously predicts a large dollar depreciation in 1981.1 Apart from these episodes, there is a close connection between the implied rational expectations path and the data. The rational expectations path does a good job of explaining the real dollar appreciation from 1996.2 to 2002.2 and the subsequent real dollar depreciation.
The learning path shown in Figure 5 generally captures closer comovements with the data and does a better job of capturing the dollar cycle of the 1980s than the rational path. The learning path exhibits the dollar appreciation and subsequent depreciation in the latter part of the sample although timing of the turning points are off a bit with the phase of the learning cycle leading the data.
In Figure 6 , the rational path generated with the HP output gap is quite similar to the path generated with the source output gap. Here, the rational path also misses the real dollar appreciation of the 1980s and signals a false appreciation in the early 1990s. The learning path in Figure 7 shows the dollar prematurely appreciating in 1979.2 and it does not generate quite the strength attained in the data by 1984.4. The learning path also leads the turning points in the dollar appreciation and depreciation beginning in 1995.2 but otherwise comoves with the data. Figure 8 plots the rational path using HP detrended unemployment. The comovements between the rational path and the data are generally quite close. From Figure 9 , it is seen that the comovmements of the learning path with the data are also quite good. The learning path matches the timing of the 1980s dollar cycle very well. Except for a phase shift that leads the data, it also captures the cycle from 1995 to 2005.
To sum up, there were six major swings in the real DM-dollar rate in the sample. Regardless of the definition used for the activity gap, each of the learning paths captured the major swings in the real exchange rate.
Additional Empirical Results
Entertaining alternative specifications concedes that model uncertainty is present and that this type of uncertainty should be incorporated in the learning algorithms of market participants. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, this section simply reports on the results from repeating the previous learning analysis on alternative specifications of the Taylor rule.
Taylor rule with contemporaneous exchange rate. The first modification that I report on uses using the Taylor rule (4) that depends on the contemporaneous real exchange rate. In this case, the MSV rational expectations solution for the exchange rate is
where the the scaler coefficients a 0 , a 1 and the 1 x 8 row vector b are functions of the VAR coefficients and the Taylor-rule coefficients. They are given recursively as
Again, the solution is not unique. In constructing the rational expectations path, I choose the solution that gives a negative value to a 1 so that an increase in the interest differential is (ceteris paribus) associated with a real appreciation. The learning path is obtained by solving (8) using expectations formed from people's perceived law of motion (see the appendix for details). Agents believe the rational expectation solution is (27) so the perceived law of motion for the exchange rate is
The results reported in Table 4 show that the comovements between the implied rational expectations exchange rate and the data are best captured when the source output gap is used in the Taylor rule (correlation =0.312). The correlation in levels is only slightly smaller than the 0.32 correlation reported by Engel and West (2006) . Another similarity with Engel and West is that the implied rational expectations exchange rates aren't sufficiently volatile when using the source output gap or the HP output gap. In returns form, the correlations are much lower. The rational model using the source output gap does a good job in matching the longer-term trends and less well in matching short-run changes. The high relative real exchange rate volatility shown in the table generated with the HP unemployment gap is an artifact of a large structural shift in the constant at the time of the policy regime change. Within subsample volatility of the rational expectations path with the HP unemployment gap are excessively smooth.
Looking now at the results for the implied learning exchange rates, it is seen that the comovements explained by levels of the learning path dominate those of the rational path when using HP output gap or the HP unemployment gap. These learning paths also do a better job of explaining real exchange rate volatility than the rational paths. Note that the relatively high correlation between the learning path and the data for 16-quarter returns ( 0.22 with source output gap) and the low correlation in the levels (0.11) reveals that the learning path can explain low-frequency exchange rate movements but is not so good at explaining the level. This can be seen in Figure  11 . The learning path exhibits the major exchange rate swings but the phase of the cycles don't match. There are significant time spans where the learning path and the data trend in the same direction, which contributes to the high correlation in 16-quarter returns, but each series lies on opposite sides of the mean, which contributes to the low correlation in levels.
Comparison to Engel-West. The results presented thus far for the rational path were qualitatively and quantitatively similar to Engel and West (2006) . However, there are several differences between our analyses that may be useful to point out. First, by using monthly data from 1979:10 to 1998:12, Engel-West assume a single fixed structure and do not consider the implications of the Volker regime shift. Second, they do not estimate the parameter values of the Taylor rule. Third, they do not allow for interest rate smoothing by including the lagged interest rate in the policy rule. Fourth, they include the contemporaneous real exchange rate in the Taylor rule. Fifth, their Taylor rule depends on the expected one-year ahead inflation. Sixth, they use a trivariate VAR for π, x, and i. Finally, their inflation is based on the CPI, and their activity gap is quadratically detrended industrial production. Despite the many differences between this paper and theirs, the similarity in the results for the rational paths is notable.
To expand on the comparison with Engel-West, I adapt their monthly model over 1979. 10-1998.12 to my quarterly data. They stated interest rates as annual rates and assumed that the authorities react to expected annual inflation. The quarterly version of their Taylor rule is
Letting Y t = (π t , ..., π t−3 , x t , ..., x t−3 , 4i t , ...4i t−3 ) 0 , the rational expectations solution is
Engel-West set γ π = 1.75, γ x = 0.25, and γ q = 0.10 and obtain a correlation between the rational and actual exchange rate of 0.32. To facilitate the comparison, I generate implied paths from the model from 1979.3 to 1998.4. Table 5 shows the results, which come reasonably close to replicating Engel-West. In my case, I obtain slightly higher correlations between the rational exchange rate and the data than Engel-West (0.45 source output gap, 0.35 HP output gap). The rational exchange rates are still too smooth but with relative volatility of 0.50 and 0.40 for the source and HP output gaps respectively, is somewhat more volatile than Engel-West who report a relative volatility of about one-fifth. Figure 12 plots the rational path which mimics quite closely the corresponding Figure 2 in Engel-West. In both cases, the rational path lies below the data from 1981 to 1986, above the data from 1986 to 1989, below the data from 1989 to 1992, and above the data from 1994 to 1998.
The construction of the learning path is described in the appendix. The learning paths using the source output gap and the HP output gap are relatively successful in explaining the lowfrequency trends in the data as seen by the levels and 16-quarter returns correlations. Like the rational paths, the learning paths struggle somewhat with short-horizon returns correlations. However, volatility of the learning paths match up with the data much better than the rational paths. Figure 13 plots the learning path built with the source output gap. As can be seen, the learning path broadly mimics the long swings in the data. Finally, the analysis of the Engel-West specification suggests that the results for the exchange rate are reasonably robust to whether or not the lagged interest rate is included in the Taylor rule.
Conclusion
Standard open economy models predict that the exchange rate is determined by differences in the levels of macroeconomic variables. The traditional focus on standard macro fundamentals in exchange rate determination has perhaps led to a rush of judgment about the irrelevance of macro-modeling of exchange rates. In contrast, the fundamental determinants of the exchange rate are relative expected inflation gaps and relative output gaps when central banks conduct monetary policy by setting interest rates according to Taylor rules.
A relatively new and growing literature shows the relevance and importance of Taylor-rule fundamentals in exchange rate determination. This paper contributes to this nascent literature by presenting evidence that the real DM-dollar exchange rate is linked to Taylor-rule fundamentals. In light of this literature, it may not be surprising that the rational paths are reasonably able to explain the data. However, placing market participants in a learning environment incorporates a realistic type of ignorance into the analysis that has not been studied in this context.
As a general statement, the learning paths performed about as well as the rational paths in explaining the real DM-dollar rate. While not a 'slam dunk,' this simple learning framework provides a reasonably good macro-fundamentals driven explanation of six major swings in the real DM-dollar exchange rate spanning from 1973 to 2005. While alternative approaches based on multiple equilibria (e.g., Flood and Rose (1999)) or micro market structure (Lyons and Evans (2003)) are worthwhile research directions to pursue, the analysis in this paper also suggests that additional work in the macroeconomic context is worthwhile.
The constant vector and coefficient matrix for the companion form of the bivariate VAR(4) in (11) is given as follows: ,1 B 1,2 B 1,3 B 1,4 B 1,5 B 1,6 B 1,7 
Deriving (15)- (19) . Solutions were obtained by the method of undetermined coefficients. The structure of the model presented in Section 3 is reproduced here for convenience.
(36) is the Taylor rule in differential form, (37) is the companion form of the VAR(4) for differentials in inflation and economic activity gaps where Y t = (π t , ..., π t−3 , x t , ..., x t−3 ) 0 and (38) is the real interest parity condition. Using (37), we have
, where e 1 and e 2 are selection (row) vectors. Substituting (36) into (38) gives
(39) Now conjecture the solution
advance time subscripts and take expectations to get
Plug (40) and (41 ) into (39), equate coefficients and obtain (16)- (19) in the text.
Deriving (28)- (29) . The Taylor rule for this case,
is reproduced here for convenience. Use the companion form to compute expected inflation, and substitute (??) into (38) to get
Conjecture the solution
Advancing the time subscript and taking expectations shows that the expected exchange rate depends on the expected interest differential. Use (42) to obtain
the result and (44) into (43). Equating coefficients gives (28)-(??).
The learning path is constructed as follows. The perceived law of motion for the exchange rate is
where B 3,t−1 = ¡ a 0,t−1 , a 2,t−1 , b 0 t−1 ¢ and Z 3,t = (1, i t, Y 0 t ) 0 , and the expected exchange rate is
which requires the expected interest differential which we get from the perceived law of motion for the interest differential,
Using (47) to forecast i t+1 at t gives
Substitute (49) into (46) and rearrange to give
The actual law of motion which generates the learning values of q t is obtained by substituting (50) into the real UIP condition (8) .
The Engel-West Case. Taylor rule states interest rates expressed at annual rates. I multiply my interest rates by 4.
where p is the relative price level. The real interest parity condition becomes
In Engel-West, inflationary expectations are constructed from the VAR (4) in (π, x, 4i). Let Y t = (π t , . . . , π t−3, x t , ..., x t−3, 4i t , ..., 4i t−3 ) 0 . Conjecture the solution
Advancing the time subscript in (53) and taking expectations gives E t q t+1 = a 0 + b (α + AY t ) . Substitute the guess solution, the Taylor rule (51) and inflationary expectations into (52). Upon equating coefficients, one obtains (33)- (35) .
The learning path is constructed as follows. The perceived law of motion for the interest differential is used to obtain η t ,
The perceived law of motion for the exchange rate is
which implies
Substituting (54) into (52) and after some rearrangement gives the actual law of motion, 5 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 log real DM-dollar DEU-USA inflation USA-DEU inflation 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 1973 1974 1976 1977 1979 1980 1982 1983 1985 1986 1988 1989 1991 1992 1994 1995 1997 1998 1973 1974 1976 1977 1979 1980 1982 1983 1985 1986 1988 1989 1991 1992 1994 1995 1997 1998 2000 2001 2003 2004 Learning path, recursive HP detrended output 1973 1974 1976 1977 1979 1980 1982 1983 1985 1986 1988 1989 1991 1992 1994 1995 1997 1998 2000 2001 2003 2004 Learning path, recursive HP detrended unemployment rate 1973 1974 1976 1977 1979 1980 1982 1983 1985 1986 1988 1989 1991 1992 1994 1995 1997 1998 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Data Rational EW path 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Learning the EW path source output gap 
